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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-1398 
___________ 
 
DANIEL J. HEFFLEY, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JUDGE CATHLEEN C. BUBASH 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-18-cv-00098) 
District Judge: Honorable Mark R. Hornak 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 22, 2018 
 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., BIBAS and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed April 1, 2019) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Pro se Appellant Daniel Heffley appeals from the District Court’s orders 
dismissing his complaint and denying reconsideration.  For the reasons detailed below, 
we will affirm. 
I. 
In the District Court, Heffley sought to file a complaint in forma pauperis (“ifp”) 
against the Appellee, Judge Cathleen C. Bubash of the Court of Common Pleas of 
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.  Heffley alleged that Judge Bubash “fraudulently” filed 
an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) complaint with the U.S. Department of Justice 
(DOJ) on Heffley’s behalf (the DOJ ultimately declined to assist Heffley in that matter).1  
Heffley also challenged Judge Bubash’s adjudication of a state court case, which appears 
to be in connection with custody proceedings.   
  The District Court granted Heffley leave to proceed ifp and screened his 
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).  The District Court dismissed the complaint, 
concluding that Heffley’s claims in the complaint were barred by judicial immunity and 
by the immunity provided by the Eleventh Amendment.  Heffley then filed a motion for 
reconsideration, claiming that Judge Bubash’s actions were beyond the scope of judicial 
immunity because she committed fraud by filing the alleged ADA complaint.  The 
                                              
1 According to Heffley, he received a letter from the DOJ, informing him that the agency 
could not assist him with his ADA complaint.  However, Heffley claims that he never 
sent the DOJ a complaint.  He seems to believe that Judge Bubash interpreted a motion to 
recuse that he had filed in her court as a complaint raising ADA violations and forwarded 
it to the DOJ on his behalf.  
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District Court denied the motion.  Heffley then filed what he called an addendum to his 
motion for reconsideration, reiterating the same claims but providing correspondence 
between him, the DOJ, and the state court regarding his questions about the ADA 
complaint.  The District Court, treating it as a second motion for reconsideration, denied 
the motion.  Heffley appeals. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 
229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  We review for abuse of discretion the District Court’s 
denial of a motion for reconsideration.  See Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. 
Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999).   
III. 
The District Court did not err in dismissing Heffley’s complaint sua sponte.  As 
noted by the District Court, Heffley’s claims against Judge Bubash are barred by the 
doctrine of judicial immunity.  Judicial immunity extends to judicial officers in the 
performance of their duties, even if their actions were “in error, w[ere] done maliciously, 
or w[ere] in excess of [their] authority,” unless the officers acted in clear absence of all 
jurisdiction.  Capogrosso v. The Supreme Ct. of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(per curiam) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  Here, the allegations 
against Judge Bubash pertain only to actions taken in her judicial capacity, while she was 
presiding over the state court matters at issue.  See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 
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355-56 (1978); see also Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006) (per 
curiam).  Although Heffley argues that Judge Bubash’s alleged action of filing the ADA 
complaint was ministerial and beyond the scope of judicial immunity, his argument is 
unpersuasive.  The actions that Heffley describes, including Judge Bubash’s 
interpretation of Heffley’s motion to recuse (which led to the filing of the ADA 
complaint on Heffley’s behalf), were judicial in nature.  See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 
11-12 (1991) (per curiam) (explaining that the doctrine of immunity applies unless (1) the 
challenged action is non-judicial in nature, or (2) the challenged action was “taken in the 
complete absence of all jurisdiction”); see also Capogrosso, 588 F.3d at 184.  Thus, the 
District Court properly dismissed Heffley’s complaint.  
Finally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant 
reconsideration.  Reconsideration is warranted if a litigant shows “(1) an intervening 
change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available 
when the court [ruled]; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent 
manifest injustice.”  Max’s Seafood Café, 176 F.3d at 677 (citation omitted).  As the 
District Court concluded, Heffley did not establish any basis for reconsideration in his 
initial motion for reconsideration or in what he called his addendum to his motion for 
reconsideration. 
Accordingly, for the reasons given, we will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 
